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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jennifer Shaw challenged the district court's denial of her motion to suppress on
appeal.

She contends that the evidence does not support a finding that there was

probable cause to support a warrantless search of the vehicle she was driving.
Specifically, she contends that the purported alert by the canine unit (Max) was not
reliable because the officer was forcing the dog to perform the sniff from a location
where the dog had poor footing, even though, according to the officer, Max is noticeably
apprehensive (i.e., less reliable) in conditions where his footing is poor. Furthermore,
the officer's testimony as to Max's training only indicates he would smell where his
human counterpart indicated he should smell. His record in the field, situations where
the officer would not already know where the drugs were located, was far less
promising, as the officer noted that Max would alert fairly frequently when drugs were
not present.
Furthermore, the officer's testimony only revealed that he believed the dog was
trying to alert, not that the dog had actually alerted; instead, the dog slipped into the
storm drain on which the officer had made him stand. Additionally, when the officer
directed Max back to that same area of the car to try again, Max did not alert. As such,
the particular circumstances of this case reveal that Max's behavior was not sufficient to
generate probable cause to justify a warrantless search. The State simply contends
that, despite these facts, Max's alert should be deemed sufficient to search the car
without a warrant.

Since the factual findings underlying that conclusion are clearly

1

erroneous and demonstrate that Max was not, in this particular circumstance, reliable,
those arguments should be rejected and the evidence should be suppressed
Ms. Shaw also contends that the inventory exception, which had been forwarded
as a justification below, was inapplicable. The State did not further that argument on
appeal, and, therefore, any response in that regard should be considered waived. In
fact, the State's response only addresses the automobile exception. As such, if this
Court determines there was not probable cause to support the warrantless search under
the automobile exception, it should reverse the district court's decision without
considering any of the other exceptions to the warrant requirement. After all, the State
bears the burden of demonstrating such exceptions are applicable, and it has not done
so.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Ms. Shaw's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES IN REPLY
1.

Whether the State is mistaken in asserting that there was sufficient information to
support the district court's finding that there was probable cause to warrantlessly
search the vehicle based on Max's purported alert.

2.

Whether the State's decision to not argue for the application of any other warrant
exception should constitute a wavier of such arguments.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The State Is Mistaken In Asserting That There Was Sufficient Information To Support
The District Court's Finding That There Was Probable Cause To Warrantlessly Search
The Vehicle Based On Max's Purported Alert
The United States Supreme Court recently clarified that, even if a canine unit is
generally reliable, "[the] circumstances surrounding a particular alert may undermine the
case for probable cause-if, say, the officer cued the dog (consciously or not), or if the
team was working under unfamiliar conditions." Florida v. Harris, _

U.S. _ , 133

S. Ct. 1050, 1059 (2013). The State contends that there was sufficient evidence upon
which to find probable cause to support a warrantless search of the car pursuant to the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement. (Resp. Br., pp.4-16.) It is mistaken
because, even if this dog is generally reliable, the circumstances surrounding this
particular event undermine the case for probable cause. Compare Harris, 133 S. Ct. at
1059. This time, Max was on unsure footing (where he is more apprehensive and less
reliable than he is generally), and the evidence suggests that he responds only to cues
from his human handler. Both of those factors undermine the case for probable cause
in this instance. See id.
In fact, the officer's testimony reveals that Max never actually alerted on the car only that his handler claimed that he attempted to alert. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.31, Ls.4-10.)
Nevertheless, the State asserts that Max did actually alert on the car. (See, e.g., Resp.
Br., p.7.)

As the testimony clearly reveals, Max did not actually alert, he only

purportedly tried to do so. (Tr., Vol.1, p.31, Ls.4-10.) Therefore, the State's assertion in
this regard is belied by the testimony of Officer Vogt. Furthermore, the evidence does
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not even support the assertion that Max was trying to alert. This particular dog is known
to be skittish when his footing is poor: "he's very, very apprehensive about slick-looking
floors, tile floors, painted concrete, stuff like that. ... [He will] do what he's supposed to
do ... [but y]ou can tell he's not as confident on those types of footing issues .... "
(Tr., Vol.1, p.27, ls.4-17.) Basically, the officer testified that Max will be concerned with
his footing while trying to do what the officer wants him to do. The reasonable inference
from that testimony is that, where Max is on unsure footing, he will divert his attention
from the task at hand to ensure stable footing, and as such, be less reliable in
performing the task at hand.

(See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.27, Ls.6-9 (testifying that Max

behaves differently when his footing is unsure, hugging the walls (maintaining his
In this case, Max's footing was unsure

footing) rather than behave normally).)

demonstrated by the fact that he actually lost his footing and slipped into the storm
drain. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.31, Ls.5-17.) Therefore, the evidence suggests that Max was
less reliable in any attempts to alert to detected odors. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.27, ls.4-17.)
Nevertheless, the State argues that Max's response at the gas tank of the car was
definite and justifies the warrantless search. (See Resp. Br., pp.4-16.) That argument
ignores the United States Supreme Court's recent discussion of such cases - that
circumstances such as this detract from the determination that probable cause exists.
See Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1059.

Therefore, the State's argument in this regard is

unavailing.
Furthermore, Officer Vogt testified that he had Max return to the same area of the
car where he had purportedly attempted to alert, to give him a second chance to alert.
(See Tr., Vol.1, p.31, L.23 - p.32, L.3.) This suggests that Officer Vogt was not at all

5

confident that Max had actually attempted to alert when he slipped into the storm drain.
More to the point, Max did not alert or attempt to alert on the car, given that opportunity
to try again. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.31, L.23 - p.32, L.3.) This fact is ignored by the State.
(See generally Resp. Br.) A dog's failure to alert after making a purported alert is a
factor that should be considered as weighing against a finding of probable cause. See

State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 707 (2012) (citing various other cases holding the
same, though also reaffirming that an alert from a reliable dog on the vehicle is itself
sufficient to generate probable cause). In this case, where it is not even clear that the
dog ever alerted (as opposed to tried to keep sure footing when the officer had him
stand on a storm drain), the case for probable cause is more substantially weakened
than in those cases cited in Anderson.

Compare id. This further demonstrates that,

given the particular circumstances in this case, there was insufficient evidence to make
the determination that Max had actually and reliably alerted on the vehicle.

Compare

Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1059. As such, the evidence in this case does not support a
determination that there was probable cause to search the vehicle without a warrant.

Compare id.; Anderson 154 Idaho at 708.
The State also erroneously contends that Max is generally reliable when it
comes to identifying narcotics. (Resp. Br. pp.14-16.) For example, it relies on Max's
performance in controlled environments as evidence of his overall reliability, discounting
the fact that Officer Vogt testified that Max will "fairly frequently" alert when no drugs are
present.

(See Resp. Br., pp.14-15.)

The United States Supreme Court's recent

decision on this matter belies the State's position: a dog's tendency to alert when no
drugs are present is a factor which impacts its reliability. See Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1057.
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"Indeed, evidence of the dog's (or handler's) history in the field, although susceptible to
the kind of misinterpretation we have discussed, 1 may sometimes be relevant .... " Id.
As such, the evidence reveals that Max is not the paragon of reliability that Aldo (the
dog from Harris) was determined to be. Compare Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058-59. Max is
known to be less reliable in the field, and is known to be particularly apprehensive in
performing when he is on unsure footing, yet the State is asserting that his actions in
those very conditions are clear enough to justify the warrantless search.
In a final effort to try and rehabilitate Max's reliability in this situation, the State
points to part of Officer Vogt's testimony relating to the manner in which he trained Max.
(Resp. Br., pp.15-16 (relying on Tr., Vol.1, p.22, Ls.8-15).) It asserts that, because Max
was able to locate places where Officer Vogt had hidden samples of drugs, that Max's
training reveals him to be reliable.

(Resp. Br., pp.15-16 (relying on Tr., Vol.1, p.22,

Ls.8-15).) It is mistaken. As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Harris, a
dog's alert may be deemed unreliable if it is responding to cues from its officer
companion, whether those cues are conscious or unconscious. Harris, 133 S. Ct at
1059. Officer Vogt testified that Max's initial training was based entirely on his cues to
the dog: that he would have Max smell a box known to contain a sample of a drug, and
then the officer would give Max his ball.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.21, Ls.22-24.) According to

Officer Vogt, all Max cared about was getting the ball. (Tr., Vol.1, p.22, Ls.2-3.) As

The Court had discussed the idea of false alerts in situations where the drugs are too
well hidden to find or where residual odor remains. See Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1056.
However, all the Court stated in this regard is that the dog's record in the field is not "the
gold standard." Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1056. It did not, as the State claims (see Resp.
Br., at pp.14-15), discount or disregard the canine's performance in the field as
evidence to be considered in the ultimate determination of whether probable cause has
arisen in a given scenario. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1056-58.
1

7

such, Officer Vogt's testimony reveals that Max was essentially trained to sniff where
Officer Vogt indicated, so that he would get his ball. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.21, L.22 - p.22,
L.3.)
This underlying premise of Max's training does not change simply because
Officer Vogt changed the location of the drug sample he wanted Max to locate. Officer
Vogt testified that he would place samples of the drugs in various locations and have
Max find them. (Tr., Vol.1, p.22, Ls.8-15.)

In that scenario, Officer Vogt still knows

where the drugs are, meaning he would be capable of cuing Max (consciously or
unconsciously) as to whether he was sniffing in the right location. Since, as Officer Vogt
testified, Max was essentially trained to sniff where Officer Vogt indicated, that
testimony suggests Max was still sniffing where Officer Vogt indicated, rather than
reliably locating the drugs himself.

See Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058 (describing blind

testing, where neither the canine nor the officer know where the drugs have been
hidden to eliminate potential cuing as a variable in the dog's performance). As such,
the evidence presented reveals that Max's training record does not demonstrate him to
be as reliable as he might seem at first glance. As a result, his purported alert in this
case is even less reliable.
The result of all this evidence is that the district court erroneously determined that
Max made a reliable alert in this case.

(See App. Br., pp.7-12.)

Because Max's

purported alert was not reliable, given the particular training methods used, his lessthan-stellar field record, and the particular circumstances surrounding this purported
alert, it was not sufficient to provide the officers with probable cause to warrantlessly
search the vehicle.

Compare Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058-59; Anderson, 154 Idaho at

8

708. As such, this Court should reverse the district court's decision to deny Ms. Shaw's
motion to suppress.

IL
The State's Decision To Not Argue For The Application Of Any Other Warrant Exception
Should Constitute A Wavier Of Such Arguments

In her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Shaw addressed the assertion, discussed in the
district court (see, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.13, L.24 - p.14, L.3; R., pp.72-78), of whether the
inventory exception might also justify the search of the vehicle. (See App. Br., pp.1214.) The State did not address that issue in its Respondent's Brief.
Resp. Br.)

(See generally

If a party wishes an issue to be considered on appeal, it must provide

argument and authority in support of that issue, or else, that argument will be
considered waived. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996). The State bears the
burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement is applicable in any
given case. See, e.g., State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302 (2007); see also Mincey v.

Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (the United States Supreme Court unanimously
holding that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable). Therefore, since the State
has not forwarded any argument in that regard, contentions that any other exception to
the warrant requirement (specifically the inventory exception) may be applicable should
be considered to be waived, since the State has offered no argument in that regard,
thereby failing to meet its burden in that regard.
As a result, if this Court determines that the automobile exception is inapplicable
in this case, it should reverse the district court's order and suppress the evidence found
in the car.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Shaw respectfully requests that this Court vacate her judgment of conviction,
reverse the district court's order denying her motion to suppress, and remand her case
for further proceedings.
DATED this 19th day of August, 2013.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

10

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 19th day of August, 2013, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
JENNIFER ELAINE SHAW
912 S JOHNS AVENUE
EMMETT ID 83617
DEBORAH A BAIL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
BRIAN MARX
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0010
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court.

BRD/eas

11

